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Ethics by Aristotle
Book, page 161 / 288


as being a vice, either wholly or partially; but none of these other
cases is so blamed.

But of those who have for their object-matter the bodily enjoyments,
which we say are also the object-matter of the man of Perfected
Self-Mastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control, he that pursues
excessive pleasures and too much avoids things which are painful (as
hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with touch
and taste), not from moral choice but in spite of his moral choice and
intellectual conviction, is termed "a man of Imperfect Self-Control,"
not with the addition of any particular object-matter as we do in
respect of want of control of anger but simply.

And a proof that the term is thus applied is that the kindred term
"Soft" is used in respect of these enjoyments but not in respect of any
of those others. And for this reason we put into the same rank the man
of Imperfect Self-Control, the man who has lost it entirely, the man
who has it, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery; but not any of those
other characters, because the former have for their object-matter the
same pleasures and pains: but though they have the same object-matter,
they are not related to it in the same way, but two of them act upon
moral choice, two without it. And so we should say that man is more
entirely given up to his passions who pursues excessive pleasures, and
avoids moderate pains, being either not at all, or at least but little,
urged by desire, than the man who does so because his desire is very
strong: because we think what would the former be likely to do if he had
the additional stimulus of youthful lust and violent pain consequent on
the want of those pleasures which we have denominated necessary?

Well then, since of desires and pleasures there are some which are in
kind honourable and good (because things pleasant are divisible, as we
said before, into such as are naturally objects of choice, such as
are naturally objects of avoidance, and such as are in themselves
indifferent, money, gain, honour, victory, for instance); in respect of
all such and those that are indifferent, men are blamed not merely for
being affected by or desiring or liking them, but for exceeding in any
way in these feelings.

And so they are blamed, whosoever in spite of Reason are mastered by,
that is pursue, any object, though in its nature noble and good; they,

 
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